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Abstract
Economic and social interaction takes place between individuals with heterogeneous charac-
teristics. We investigate experimentally the emergence and informal enforcement of diﬀerent
contribution norms to a public good in homogeneous and diﬀerent heterogeneous groups.
When punishment is not allowed all groups converge towards free-riding. With punishment,
contributions increase and diﬀer distinctly across groups and individuals with diﬀerent in-
duced characteristics. We show econometrically that these diﬀerences are not accidentally
but enforced by punishment. The enforced contribution norms are related to fairness ideas of
equity regarding the contributions but not regarding the earnings. Individuals with diﬀerent
characteristics tacitly agree on the norm to be enforced, even if this leads to large payoﬀ
diﬀerences. Our results also emphasize the role of details of the environment that may alter
focal contribution norms in an important way.
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1 Introduction
The need for cooperation among people with heterogeneous characteristics is an undeniable fact
of social and economic life. At the work place, teams are composed of workers who may diﬀer in
their productivity, ability, and motivation (Hamilton et al., 2003). Irrigation systems are often
jointly used and maintained by farmers of diﬀerent sizes and water needs.1 People also can
derive very diﬀerent beneﬁts from public goods. For example, the elevation of dams along the
Mississippi river gives very diﬀerent beneﬁts to individuals who live close to the river compared
to those who live further away. In the international political and economical arena, countries
that hugely diﬀer in size and wealth are often confronted with situations that require them to
ﬁnd joint agreements in order to overcome social dilemmas. Sandler and Hartley (2001) discus
this problem in the framework of international military alliances. Other prominent examples
include the Kyoto protocol for the reduction of emissions of green house gases, ﬁshing quotas
among European Union members for the mitigation of over-ﬁshing of open waters, and the Global
Disease Detection Program spearheaded by the United States for the early detection of infectious
diseases.
As diverse the above examples seem, they can all be viewed as special cases of a more
general public goods problem where the enforcement of cooperation by third-parties is infeasible
or very limited (e.g., due to actions being unobservable or the nonexistence of a supranational
institution with coercive power). In such situations, cooperation has to be promoted through
other mechanisms such as social norms that are informally enforced (Elster, 1989; Coleman,
1990).2 The importance of social norms for sustaining cooperative behavior in public goods
environments has been demonstrated in a number of controlled laboratory experiments (for
recent reviews see, Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Ga¨chter and Herrmann, 2009). However, this
experimental evidence is based on homogeneous-group environments, and therefore, neglects the
important fact that people diﬀer. This is potentially a serious shortcoming because people who
diﬀer may also adhere to diﬀerent norms, which may lead to conﬂicts and ineﬃciencies. In this
paper, we experimentally investigate the emergence and informal enforcement of contribution
1For instance, in the western states of the United States, family farms dependent on irrigation vary in annual
farm sales from below $100,000 to above $500,000 (U.S.D.A., 2004).
2Social norms are a widespread empirical phenomenon (Becker, 1996; Hechter and Opp, 2001; Posner,
2002). Numerous examples of the impact of norms on behavior have been meticulously documented (e.g.,
Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1947; Whyte, 1955; Hywel, 1985; Sober and Wilson, 1997; Gurven, 2004). For exam-
ples of the role of norms in the use of common resources see Ostrom (1990).
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norms in the presence of heterogeneity.
Since the seminal paper of Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000), a series of studies has contributed to our
understanding of the emergence and enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with
homogeneous groups. Generally, in homogeneous groups, people sanction those who contribute
less than they do (and sometimes also those who contribute more). This behavior is consistent
with the enforcement of a norm that prescribes equal contributions by all group members and
is often successful in supporting relatively high levels of cooperation.3 In homogeneous groups,
given the symmetry of actors, such an equal-contributions norm is intuitively appealing and is
in concordance with important general fairness principles: equality and equity (Konow, 2003).4
In heterogeneous groups it is much less obvious what contribution norm may emerge, if
one emerges at all. Diﬀerent and probably conﬂicting notions of fairness may be invoked by
diﬀerent people depending on their characteristics. If, for instance, people diﬀer in their income,
a norm of equal contributions may be appealing to those with more resources and a norm
based on contributions proportional to income may be preferred by those with less resources.
Similarly, if people are heterogeneous with respect to their preferences for the public good (or
their productivity in producing it) equal contributions may be preferred by those who derive a
lot of pleasure from the provision of the public good whereas those who enjoy the public good
less may prefer a norm with asymmetric contributions. In contrast to homogeneous groups, the
experimental evidence regarding contributions to public goods in heterogeneous groups is much
less conclusive,5 and evidence on the enforcement of contribution norms in heterogeneous groups
is basically absent.6
3The success of informal sanctioning in supporting cooperative behavior has been shown to depend on the
costs and eﬀectiveness of the sanctioning (Anderson and Putterman, 2006; Carpenter, 2006; Egas and Riedl, 2008;
Masclet and Villeval, 2008; Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008; Sutter et al., 2008), the possibility of taking revenge
(Denant-Boemont et al., 2007; Nikiforakis, 2008), availability of information (Carpenter, 2007), communication
opportunities (Bochet et al., 2006), and cultural factors (Ga¨chter et al., 2008).
4Equality and equity considerations are commonly called upon in normative research and have been extensively
discussed by numerous philosophers (e.g., Aristotle, 1925; Rawls, 1971; Corlett, 2003). Equality is also commonly
invoked in social choice theory as axioms of symmetry and anonymity (e.g., Moulin, 1991; Gaertner, 2006).
5Experiments investigating endowment heterogeneity report mixed results. Ostrom et al. (1994), van Dijk et al.
(2002), and Cherry et al. (2005) ﬁnd that inequality leads to lower contributions, Chan et al. (1996) and
Buckley and Croson (2006) report a positive eﬀect, and Chan et al. (1999) and Sadrieh and Verbon (2006) no
eﬀect. With respect to heterogeneity in the marginal beneﬁt from the public good, Fisher et al. (1995) ﬁnd that
individuals with a high marginal beneﬁt contribute more than those with a low marginal beneﬁt.
6To our knowledge, the only experiment that combines endowment heterogeneity and punishment possibilities
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In this paper we provide experimental evidence for the emergence and informal enforcement
of diﬀerent contribution norms in a repeated linear public good game when people diﬀer in their
endowment or their preference for the public good. In total, we implement eight treatments con-
sisting of four diﬀerent heterogeneity conditions, each with and without punishment possibilities.
In the unequal endowment treatments, heterogeneity is introduced by providing one person (out
of three) with an endowment that is twice as high as the endowment of the other group members.
To control for the eﬀect of the extended contribution possibilities due to a larger endowment,
we restrict the contribution possibilities to be the same for all group members in one pair of
treatments, whereas in another pair we allow for contributions up to the entire endowment. In
a third treatment pair, we keep endowments the same for all group members but induce a 50
percent higher marginal beneﬁt from the public good for one of the three group members. As
control treatments, we also examine behavior in homogeneous groups (with and without punish-
ment). Our design allows us to isolate the eﬀect of unequal endowments, unequal contribution
possibilities, and unequal preferences for the public good on contribution behavior as well as
their interaction with sanctioning possibilities within one experimental setting.
We ﬁnd that without punishment possibilities, heterogeneity does not matter much. In all
treatments free-riding is relatively frequent and steadily increases over time. In other words, we
do not ﬁnd evidence for a contribution norm other than free-riding to emerge. In the treatments
with punishment the picture changes drastically. In homogeneous as well as heterogeneous
groups, contributions are much higher than without punishment and they do not decrease over
time. More importantly, the contribution pattern diﬀers strongly across treatments. In the
treatment with unequal endowments and unrestricted contribution possibilities, contributions
are proportional to endowments. Similarly, in the treatment with unequal marginal beneﬁts
from the public good, contributions are almost perfectly proportional to the ratio of marginal
beneﬁts. In contrast, in the treatment with constrained contribution possibilities, group members
with large endowments contribute not more than other group members despite the fact that they
have an endowment that is twice as large. We show econometrically that contributions do not
is Visser and Burns (2006). They report that among South African ﬁshermen punishment eﬀectively promotes co-
operation in both homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. In Reuben and Riedl (2009) we show that in privileged
groups—that is, groups in which one player has a dominant strategy to contribute a positive amount—punishment
does not promote contributions as eﬀectively as in homogeneous groups. Tan (2008) ﬁnds a similar result for non-
privileged heterogeneous groups and Noussair and Tan (2009) report that voting on punishment is not eﬀectively
increasing contributions in such groups.
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diﬀer accidently but are the result of informal enforcement of diﬀerent contribution norms in
the diﬀerent treatments. Interestingly, irrespective of diﬀerences in endowments and marginal
beneﬁts from the public good, individuals within a group largely agree on which contribution
norm to enforce—even when the norm implies that a group of individuals beneﬁts relatively
more.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design and
procedures. Section 3 discusses diﬀerent focal and potentially conﬂicting contribution norms,
given the heterogeneity among group members. Section 4 reports the contribution rates of the
diﬀerent treatments and presents the results regarding the enforcement of diﬀerent contribution
norms. Section 5 concludes and discusses our results.
2 Experimental Design
The basic game implemented in the experiment is a linear public good game that is played by
the same group of three subjects for ten consecutive periods. The game consists of a contribution
stage in which each subject i receives an endowment of yi points. Subjects simultaneously decide
how many points, ci, they want to contribute to the public good, where ci ∈ [0, c¯i] and c¯i is person
i’s maximum contribution. Every point contributed to the public good by any group member
increases i’s earnings by αi points and every point not contributed by i increases i’s earnings by
one point. If αi < 1 for all i and
∑
i αi > 1, then each point contributed increases the sum of
earnings in the group but decreases the earnings of the contributing subject, creating a tension
between individual and group interest. Subject i’s earnings at the end of the contribution stage
are given by
πi = yi − ci + αi
∑
j
cj.
Each subject takes part in one of eight treatments, which vary along two dimensions: ﬁrst,
in the degree of heterogeneity of endowments and marginal beneﬁts from the public good, and
second, in the possibility to punish other group members or not (see Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000).
Two treatments correspond to the standard public good game with homogeneous groups
played with and without punishment, respectively. In these treatments, each group member
i has the same endowment yi = 20 points, and receives the same marginal beneﬁt from the
public good αi = 0.50. We call these treatments Equal (see Table 1). In the remaining six
treatments, groups are heterogeneous: group members diﬀer either in their endowment or in
their marginal beneﬁt from the public good. Speciﬁcally, in each group one member receives a
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Table 1: Experimental treatments
Group
type
Subject’s
type
yi αi c¯i
Number of groups
without/with punishment
Equal low 20 points 0.50 20 points 7 / 6
URE
low 20 points 0.50 20 points
7 / 7
high 40 points 0.50 20 points
UUE
low 20 points 0.50 20 points
6 / 6
high 40 points 0.50 40 points
UMB
low 20 points 0.50 20 points
7 / 6
high 20 points 0.75 20 points
higher endowment or a higher marginal beneﬁt from the public good than the other two group
members. For convenience we refer to the former as the high type and to the latter as the low
type.7
In two treatments, high types receive an endowment of yH = 40 points whereas low types get
yL = 20 points. Importantly, in these treatments contributions of both high and low types are
restricted to a maximum of 20 points. We refer to these as the unequal-restricted-endowments
treatments or URE. In two further treatments, high types again receive yH = 40 points and
low types yL = 20 points. However, in contrast to URE the contributions of high types are
unrestricted (i.e., c¯H = 40 points). We refer to these treatments as the unequal-unrestricted-
endowments treatments or UUE. In the ﬁnal two treatments, both types receive the same en-
dowment of 20 points but high types earn a marginal beneﬁt from the public good equal to
αH = 0.75 while low types earn αL = 0.50. Correspondingly, we refer to them as the unequal-
marginal-beneﬁt treatments or UMB. The eight treatments are summarized in Table 1 along
with the number of independent groups in each.
As mentioned, in half of the treatments subjects have no possibility to punish. In these
treatments subjects’ earnings at the end of a period correspond to their earnings after the
contribution stage (see above). In the remaining half, subjects can punish each other as in
Fehr and Ga¨chter (2002). In these treatments, the contribution stage is followed by a punishment
stage, in which each individual is informed of the contributions of the other group members.8
7In each group, subjects are randomly assigned to high and low types at the beginning of the experiment, and
they stay in their role throughout the ten periods. This procedure is known to all participants.
8Subjects know the values of yi, αi, c¯i of all group members. Hence, they can identify the contribution of high
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Each subject i simultaneously decides how many punishment points, pij ∈ [0, 10], to assign to
each subject j = i in the group. Each punishment point costs the punisher one point and reduces
the earnings of the punished subject by three points.9 After the punishment stage, subjects are
informed of the total number of punishment points assigned to them. As in Fehr and Ga¨chter
(2000, 2002), subjects do not receive speciﬁc information concerning who punished whom. In
the treatments with punishment, at the end of a period, earnings of a subject i are given by10
πi = yi − ci + αi
∑
j
cj − 3
∑
j =i
pji −
∑
j =i
pij.
Treatments Equal and URE diﬀer only in the higher endowment of one group member.
Thus, comparing these treatments allows us to isolate the eﬀect of endowment heterogeneity
on contributions and punishment behavior of both high and low types. Due to the restriction
on the contributions of high types in URE, we can be sure that any diﬀerences in behavior
are solely driven by the fact that high types possess a high endowment and not because they
can contribute more to the public good. The eﬀect of higher contribution possibilities can
be examined by comparing URE with UUE. Finally, comparing Equal with UMB allows us to
investigate the eﬀect of diﬀerences in the marginal beneﬁts from the public good on contributions
and punishment for given equal endowments.
Experimental Procedures
The computerized experiment was conducted in the CREED laboratory of the University of Am-
sterdam using the typical procedures of anonymity, neutrally-worded instructions, and monetary
incentives. In total, 156 subjects participated in the one-hour long experiment. About half of
the subjects were female. Also around half were students of economics (the other half came from
other ﬁelds such as biology, engineering, political science, and law). Average earnings equaled
e13.45 (≈US$17.50).
and low types.
9In line with Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000) and others, we impose an upper limit on the amount of punishment i
can assign to each j. The reason for this restriction is to prevent subjects with higher earnings from having the
capability to punish more than subjects with lower earnings (as punishment is funded through their own earnings).
10To avoid subjects making losses during the experiment solely by the actions of others, if punished below zero
points a subject i earns: πi = max[0, yi − ci + αi
∑
j
cj − 3
∑
j =i
pji]−
∑
j =i
pij . Subjects may accept to incur a
loss through the punishment points they deal out, in case they have less than twenty points after the contribution
stage (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000).
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After arrival in the lab’s reception room, each subject drew a card to be randomly assigned
to a seat in the laboratory. Once everyone was seated, the instructions for the experiment were
read aloud (a translation of the instructions, which are originally in Dutch, can be found in the
online appendix at http://www.ereuben.net/). Thereafter, subjects answered a few questions
to ensure their understanding of the instructions. When all subjects had correctly answered
the questions, the computerized experiment (programmed with z-Tree, Fischbacher, 2007) was
started. After the ten periods, subjects had to answer a short debrieﬁng questionnaire and were
conﬁdentially paid their earnings in cash.
3 Focal and Conﬂicting Contribution Norms
If all subjects are rational and maximize solely their monetary earnings, all individuals in all
treatments are predicted not to contribute to the public good. However, previous experimen-
tal evidence from homogeneous groups suggests that: (i) without punishment there is some
initial cooperation that decreases to low levels over time (Ledyard, 1995), and (ii) with punish-
ment, sanctions are used to enforce high contribution levels that do not decline with repetition
(Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000; Ga¨chter and Herrmann, 2009).11
Our main interest is the possible emergence of contribution norms in homogeneous groups
and in diﬀerent types of heterogeneous groups. In homogeneous groups, where all group members
are symmetric at the outset and equal contributions imply equal earnings, it is natural to think
that the ensuing contribution norm is one in which everyone contributes an equal amount. In
this respect, it is interesting to note that many researchers implicitly assume such an equal-
contributions norm when they analyze punishment behavior in public good games. For example,
it is commonly assumed that punishment is motivated by deviations from either the average
contribution (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000, 2002; Anderson and Putterman, 2006; Sefton et al., 2007),
the punisher’s contribution (Ga¨chter et al., 2008; Egas and Riedl, 2008; Sutter et al., 2008), or
both (Masclet et al., 2003; Masclet and Villeval, 2008; Nikiforakis, 2008). In all these cases an
equal-contributions norm is assumed.12 In heterogeneous groups, it is much less obvious what
11Models of social preferences have been proposed to explain these deviations from standard economic theory
(for a review see, Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). For the treatments without punishment these models predict low
contribution levels in all treatments. For the treatments with punishment they predict a large number of equilibria,
including some with high contribution levels (see e.g., Boyd and Richerson, 1992; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
12A notable exception to the common assumption of an equal-contributions norm in homogeneous groups is
Carpenter and Matthews (2008). They explicitly look for diﬀerent contribution norms and ﬁnd, in a setting
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Table 2: Focal contribution norms
Note: Contribution norms implied by the fairness concepts of equality and equity applied to
both contributions and earnings. Equity can be interpreted as proportionality with respect to
endowments or to marginal beneﬁts (y or α), or proportionality with respect to the capacity to
contribute (c¯).
Equality
Equity to Equity to
Equality
Equity to Equity to
y or α c¯ y or α c¯
applied to contributions applied to earnings
Equal ci = cj ci = cj ci = cj ci = cj ci = cj ci = cj
URE cH = cL cH = 2cL cH = cL cH = 20, cL = 0 cH =
2
3
cL cH = 20, cL = 0
UUE cH = cL cH = 2cL cH = 2cL cH = 20 + cL cH =
2
3
cL cH =
2
3
cL
UMB cH = cL cH =
3
2
cL cH = cL cH = 2cL cH =
3
4
cL cH = 2cL
the contribution norm would be.
The literature on fair allocation rules provides two prominent fairness concepts that can be
used to predict the contribution norms that might emerge in heterogeneous groups: equality and
equity (Konow, 2003; Konow et al., 2009). Equality is generally thought of as the equalization
of output or outcomes with no necessary link to individual input or capacity. In contrast,
equity is mostly interpreted as the dependence of fair outcomes—in a proportional way—on
individual eﬀort or ability. In Table 2 we summarize the contribution norms implied by the
various interpretations of these two fairness concepts in the framework of our experiment. In the
following paragraphs we discuss them in turn.
If subjects interpret equality as equality in contributions, then trivially the equal-contributions
norm will emerge in both homogeneous and heterogeneous groups (i.e., everyone contributes
equal amounts irrespective of diﬀerences in endowments or marginal beneﬁts). Alternatively, if
subjects apply the concept of equity, then contributions ought to be proportional. For exam-
ple, in UUE proportionality implies a contribution norm in which high types contribute twice
as much as low types. In the other heterogeneous treatments, however, it is possible to have
conﬂicting interpretations of proportionality. In URE, on the one hand, proportionality can be
related to unequal endowments, in which case high types should contribute twice the amount
of low types. On the other hand, consistent with Major and Deaux (1982), proportionality can
with incomplete information and in-group and out-group punishment possibilities, that the decision to punish is
triggered by deviations from almost full contributions, and that the amount of punishment depends on deviations
from contribution rates of 36 percent.
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be applied to the equal capacity to contribute, which implies that both types should contribute
the same. In UMB, contributions proportional to marginal beneﬁts entail a contribution norm
in which high types contribute 50 percent more than low types, whereas proportionality with
respect to the capacity to contribute translates into equal contributions for both types. In
light of the evidence that individuals often resort to fairness concepts in a self-serving manner
(Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997), the possible diﬀerent interpretations of proportionality allow
for low and high types subscribing to focal but conﬂicting contribution norms.
If subjects interpret equality as equality in earnings, then in both URE and UUE, high types
should contribute 20 points more than low types, which in URE implies that low types do not
contribute at all. In UMB equality in earnings means that high types contribute twice as much as
low types. Applied to earnings, the concept of equity—in the sense of maintaining proportionality
to endowments or marginal beneﬁts from the public good—is somewhat counterintuitive. It
implies that low types ought to contribute more than high types: 50 percent more in URE and
UUE and 33 percent more in UMB. Proportionality of earnings to the capacity to contribute
implies again that low types ought to contribute more than high types in UUE, but has the
opposite implication in URE and UMB. In URE, low types should not contribute at all, and in
UMB, they should contribute half as much as high types.
The application of the discussed fairness concepts considerably narrows down the set of
contribution norms that might emerge. However, only in the homogeneous case all concepts
lead to a coinciding focal norm. In heterogeneous groups the diﬀerent conﬂicting norms make it
impossible to tell theoretically which contribution norm will emerge, if a unique norm emerges at
all. In the next section we investigate empirically which norm emerges in the diﬀerent treatments.
4 Experimental results
In this section we ﬁrst report the contributions to the public good in all treatments with and
without punishment. We concentrate on the behavior of high and low types and on whether
diﬀerent types display diﬀerent contribution patterns. Thereafter, we investigate econometrically
the enforcement of contribution norms through punishment.
4.1 Contribution rates
Without punishment, behavior in Equal shows the commonly-observed pattern of initially pos-
itive contributions that decrease over time. The Spearman rank-order correlation between mean
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group contributions and periods is signiﬁcantly negative (ρ = −0.584, p ≤ 0.001). In each of the
unequal treatments, we observe a similar decreasing pattern for both low (ρ ≤ −0.373, p ≤ 0.003)
and high types (ρ ≤ −0.315, p ≤ 0.008).
Table 3 reports the average absolute contribution levels and average contributions relative
to endowments for all treatments divided by type. Since we are interested in how emerging
contribution norms might lead to persistent diﬀerences in the behavior of high and low types,
we concentrate on the second half of the game to account for potential learning and experience
eﬀects.13
Given that high types have twice the endowment of low types in URE and UUE, and a 50
percent higher marginal beneﬁt from the public good in UMB, it is reasonable to expect that
their absolute contributions will be higher than those of low types. Surprisingly, the descriptive
statistics for treatments without punishment (see ﬁrst two columns in Table 3) show only small
diﬀerences in the average absolute contributions of the two types. This impression is corroborated
by statistical tests. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests do not ﬁnd that high types contribute signiﬁcantly
more than low types in any of the unequal treatments (one-sided tests, p > 0.118).14 Similarly,
if we use Kruskal-Wallis tests to compare the contributions of each type across all treatments,
we cannot reject the hypothesis that absolute contributions in all treatments are drawn from
the same distribution (low types: p = 0.374; high types: p = 0.711). Lastly, for all types in all
treatments, last-period contributions are very close to zero.15
In summary, without punishment there is a surprisingly little diﬀerence in contributions
across the diﬀerent types and treatments. Neither a 100 percent larger endowment nor a 50
percent higher beneﬁt from the public good by one group member leads to signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
contributions. As in homogeneous groups, contributions in heterogeneous groups decrease over
time towards full free-riding. This shows that in these treatments, the emerging contribution
norm is independent of within-group heterogeneity and the contribution possibilities of the high
type. In particular, without punishment opportunities, in all treatments full free-riding emerges
as the prevalent behavior.
13Descriptive statistics of average contributions for each period can be found in the online appendix
(http://www.ereuben.net/). There, we also provide a statistical analysis using data from all periods and pooling
across types.
14Given the similarity of average absolute contributions, it is evident that average relative contributions are
lower for high types than for low types in URE and UUE.
15The percentage of subjects that contributed two points or less in the last period are: Equal 85.71%, URE:
90.48%, UUE: 88.89%, and UMB 76.19%.
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Table 3: Average contributions
Note: Average contribution to the public good, by each type and treatment, in
absolute terms and relative to the endowment. Data corresponds to the last ﬁve
periods. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
without punishment with punishment
absolute relative absolute relative
low high low high low high low high
Equal 2.23 – 0.11 – 16.38 – 0.82 –
(2.11) – (0.11) – (4.02) – (0.20) –
URE 4.24 5.63 0.21 0.14 14.36 13.66 0.72 0.34
(2.52) (4.22) (0.13) (0.11) (5.47) (5.97) (0.27) (0.15)
UUE 5.18 4.10 0.26 0.10 15.32 28.27 0.77 0.71
(5.50) (4.29) (0.27) (0.11) (5.96) (11.53) (0.30) (0.29)
UMB 6.71 7.77 0.34 0.39 11.43 14.30 0.57 0.72
(5.08) (7.18) (0.25) (0.36) (5.46) (5.61) (0.27) (0.28)
In the Equal treatment, the introduction of punishment leads to a signiﬁcant increase in
contributions. In the last ﬁve periods, contributions are 14.15 points higher with punishment than
without punishment. Furthermore, with punishment, contributions do not show a statistically
signiﬁcant decreasing trend (Spearman’s ρ = 0.248, p = 0.056).
In the unequal treatments, punishment has the same qualitative eﬀect. However, the size of
the eﬀect varies considerably across treatments and types (see Table 3, four rightmost columns).
For low types, the increase in contributions ranges from 10.13 points in UUE to only 4.72 points
in UMB. For high types, it ranges from 24.17 points in UUE to 6.53 points in UMB.16 It is also
the case that, with punishment, contributions do not display a statistically signiﬁcant decrease
by any type in any of the unequal treatments (low types: ρ ≥ −0.042, p ≥ 0.728; high types:
ρ ≥ −0.003; p ≥ 0.984).
Introducing punishment opportunities has a strong diﬀerential eﬀect on the contributions
of low and high types, with interesting diﬀerences across treatments. In URE, low and high
types contribute almost the same amount in absolute terms (14.36 and 13.66 points on average).
16To test the statistical signiﬁcance of these increases we use Mann-Whitney U tests. As we have a clear
directional hypothesis, we use one-sided tests. We test separately each type and treatment using group averages
across the last ﬁve periods as independent observations. The p-values for low types are: p = 0.001 for Equal,
p = 0.002 for URE, p = 0.012 for UUE, and p = 0.058 for UMB. The p-values for high types are: p = 0.009 for
URE, p = 0.003 for UUE, and p = 0.087 for UMB.
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Consequently, relative to their endowment, high types contribute only half as much as low types.
This stands in stark contrast to contribution levels of low and high types in UUE. There, the
mean absolute contributions of high types (28.27 points) are almost twice as high as that of low
types (15.32 points), implying that relative contributions are very similar (on average, 0.71 for
high types and 0.77 for low types). In UMB, we also observe a diﬀerence in average contributions
between low and high types. High types contribute 14.30 points whereas low types contribute
only 11.43 points. Hence, high types contribute 25.11 percent more.17
The varying eﬀect of punishment is also reﬂected in a clear diﬀerence in the behavior of high
types across treatments. Kruskal-Wallis tests reject the null hypothesis that the contributions of
high types are drawn form the same distribution (p = 0.031 for absolute contributions and p =
0.032 for relative contributions). Pair-wise comparisons reveal that the absolute contributions of
high types in UUE, which are 28.27 points on average, are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the absolute
contributions of high types in URE and UMB, which are on average 13.66 and 14.30 points,
respectively (two-sided Mann-Whitney U tests p ≤ 0.050).18 Analogously, relative contributions
are signiﬁcantly lower in the URE treatment when compared to UUE and UMB (two-sided Mann-
Whitney tests, p ≤ 0.050). In other words, punishment has the strongest eﬀect on behavior of
high types in UUE. In this treatment high types contribute about six times more with punishment
than without punishment, whereas in the other two treatments there is ‘only’ a two- to threefold
increase in contributions. In contrast, the contributions of low types are very similar across
all treatments (including the Equal treatment). For low types, a Kruskal-Wallis test does not
reject the null hypothesis that contributions come from the same distribution (p = 0.319).
In summary, in keeping with existing studies of homogeneous groups, punishment also in-
creases contributions and eliminates the decreasing trend in contributions in heterogeneous
groups. Importantly, punishment induces recognizable quantitative diﬀerences in the contribu-
tions of diﬀerent types within and across treatments. In URE, where the maximum contribution
of high types is bound to be the same as that of low types, both types contribute equally in spite
of the fact that high types have twice the endowment of low types and that their contributions
17Using Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests to see whether the absolute contributions of high types are signiﬁcantly
higher than those of low types gives the following p-values: p = 0.877 for URE, p = 0.014 for UUE, and p = 0.056
for UMB (one-sided tests). Applying the same tests to relative contributions gives: p = 0.018 for URE, p = 0.206
for UUE, and p = 0.116 for UMB (two-sided tests).
18Throughout the paper, whenever we carry out multiple pair-wise comparisons, we correct p-values using the
Benjamini-Hochberg method—which reduces the risk of false positives and controls for the rate of false negatives
(Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995).
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are well below the maximum. In contrast, in UUE high types contribute twice as much as low
types, and in UMB they contribute about 25 percent more.
These results clearly suggest that subjects are following diﬀerent contribution norms in the
diﬀerent treatments. In URE contributions are consistent with a norm in which both types
contribute the same in absolute terms. In UUE, behavior is consistent with a norm in which
contributions diﬀer and are proportional to the endowment. In UMB, contributions are roughly
in line with contributions being proportional to the relative marginal beneﬁts from the public
good (i.e., low types contribute 33 percent less). Note that all these norms, if applied to the
homogeneous case, imply that everyone should contribute the same amount. Given that in
treatments without punishment contributions are very similar across treatments and types, it is
likely that the diﬀerences we observe in treatments with punishment are the result of diﬀerences
in punishment behavior. In particular, subjects might be using punishment to enforce diﬀerent
contribution norms in the diﬀerent treatments. In the following section we explore precisely this
conjecture.
4.2 Punishment and the enforcement of heterogeneous norms
In homogeneous groups, given that everyone is in the same position, it is reasonable to assume
that when individuals decide who and how much to punish, they treat diﬀerences in contribu-
tions of diﬀerent people in the same way. In heterogeneous groups, it is harder to know a priori
how individuals compare diﬀerences in contributions. In principle, one could assume a speciﬁc
motivation for punishment (e.g., equalize earnings) and then use it to make treatment compar-
isons. However, given the numerous ways interpersonal comparisons can be made (see Table 2)
and our limited knowledge of how subjects perceive contributions in heterogeneous situations,
we opt for a more ﬂexible empirical approach. In particular, we aim at insights about the type
of interpersonal comparisons individuals are making in the diﬀerent treatments, and at how they
depend on the individual’s type.
For our analysis, we only assume that subjects have some idea—based on a contribution
norm—about what the contribution of others compared to their own should be, and that at least
some subjects are willing to punish individuals who deviate from this contribution. This is a
relatively weak assumption that is consistent with existing evidence from experiments of public
good games with punishment in homogeneous groups.19
19For example, Ga¨chter et al. (2008) ﬁnd this pattern in sixteen diﬀerent countries across the world. Other
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We do not assume a speciﬁc contribution norm but elicit the norm that is most consistent
with the observed punishment data. More speciﬁcally, we estimate the following model:
pijt = βneg max[μcit − (1− μ)cjt, 0] + βpos max[(1− μ)cjt − μcit, 0] + vi + ijt, (1)
where pijt is the amount of punishment that i allots to j in period t. The term μ ∈ [0, 1]
captures the norm of how much subjects expect others to contribute in comparison to their own
contribution. The ﬁrst term in the model corresponds to negative deviations from this relative
contribution norm. For example, if μ = 0.50 and therefore 1 − μ = 0.50 then the ﬁrst term
in (1) is positive whenever cjt < cit. In other words, subjects expect others to contribute as
much as they do, and if someone contributes less, they consider this to be a negative deviation.
Alternatively, if μ = 0.75 and therefore 1 − μ = 0.25 then subjects consider that a negative
deviation occurs when cjt < 3cit, which implies that subjects expect others to contribute three
times as much as they do. In the extremes, if μ = 0, subjects expect to contribute everything
themselves and others to contribute nothing, and if μ = 1, subjects expect to contribute nothing
themselves and others to contribute everything. The second term in (1) corresponds to positive
deviations, which are evaluated using the same μ. The variable vi captures unobserved individual
characteristics, and ijt is the error term.
To ﬁnd the value of μ that best explains the data, we estimate (1) using values of μ between
zero and one in steps of 0.01. For consistency reasons, we restrict the values of βneg and βpos
to be greater than or equal to zero. Given that punishment is bounded by zero and ten, we
use Tobit estimates. Furthermore, we treat the unobserved individual characteristics as random
eﬀects. Lastly, we use punishment data from all periods (as opposed to only the last ﬁve) because
punishment occurs more often at the beginning of the game, and it is then when contribution
norms should start to emerge.
In Equal, as subjects are in symmetric positions, we look for one value for μ. In the heteroge-
neous treatments, we distinguish between types and look for a value of μ in each of the following
cases: low types punishing high types, low types punishing low types, and high types punishing
low types. This allows us to detect not only diﬀerences in punishment across treatments, but
also between types. Below we present the results of the estimation just described.20
examples include Ga¨chter and Herrmann (2007), Egas and Riedl (2008), Nikiforakis (2008), and Reuben and Riedl
(2009).
20In order to check the robustness of our results, we also estimate (1) using the following variations: (i) adding
the period t and the total group contributions as additional dependent variables, (ii) considering only subjects
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Figure 1: Goodness of ﬁt for diﬀerent values of μ
Note: Log likelihood obtained when estimating (1) for values of μ ∈ [0, 1]. The log likelihood
is normalized such that 0 equals the log likelihood of the worst ﬁtting regression and 1 that of
the best ﬁtting regression.
The relative ﬁts of regressions for the various values of μ in each treatment are depicted in
Figure 1. The ﬁgure shows, for values of μ ∈ [0, 1], the value of the log likelihood obtained when
estimating (1). For convenience and the sake of comparison, we normalized the log likelihood
such that 0 equals the log likelihood of a regression where we set βneg = βpos = 0 (i.e., only with
the constant), and 1 equals the log likelihood of the regression with the value of μ that gives the
best ﬁt. Henceforth, we refer to the μ of the best-ﬁtting regression as μ∗. Furthermore, we use
who punish at least once, (iii) using Logit estimates and treating punishment as a binary decision (either punish or
not), and (iv) treating the unobserved individual characteristics vi as unconditional ﬁxed eﬀects. These variations
give very similar results, which are available in the online appendix (http://www.ereuben.net/).
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a subscript to indicate the type of the punisher and punished (e.g., μ∗L→H indicates the case of
low types punishing high types).
In Equal, one can see that the ﬁt of the model has a clear maximum at the focal μ∗L→L = 0.50.
In other words, the best ﬁt is obtained for the μ that implies that subjects punish those who
deviate from their own contribution. Moreover, deviations from this value of μ monotonically
worsen the model’s performance.
A unique global maximum of μ is also observed for both types in the heterogeneous groups
treatments. In URE we ﬁnd that μ∗L→H = μ
∗
L→L = μ
∗
H→L. That is, low and high types
enforce on (other) low types the same contribution norm, and low types do not diﬀerentiate
between types. For UUE and UMB, we ﬁnd that subjects do make a distinction between types
as μ∗L→H > μ
∗
L→L > μ
∗
H→L. Hence, subjects’ punishment behavior reveals that they expect high
types to contribute more than low types, and judging from the diﬀerences between the values of
μ∗, more so in the UUE treatment. To see this more clearly, we present in Table 4 the values of
μ∗ in each treatment—along with the estimated coeﬃcients of the corresponding regression.
In all treatments, μ∗L→L is very close to or exactly 0.50, which reveals that low types expect
other low types to contribute as much as they do, independent of the group heterogeneity. Diﬀer-
ences between treatments occur when low types punish high types and vice versa. Remarkably,
in URE low types expect high types to contribute as much as they and other low types do since
μ∗L→L = μ
∗
L→H = 0.50. In UUE, in contrast, μ
∗
L→H = 0.65, which implies that low types expect
high types to contribute roughly twice as much as they do. Hence, it is the high types’ ability
to contribute more and not simply their higher endowment that makes low types demand that
high types contribute more than low types. In UMB, low types also demand that high types
contribute more but by a smaller amount: μ∗L→H = 0.56 translates into roughly 25 percent higher
contributions.
Consistent with the low types’ contribution norm, high types in URE expect low types to
contribute as much as they do (i.e., μ∗H→L = 0.50). In contrast, in UUE, high types expect low
types to contribute less. In this treatment, in agreement with the low types’ contribution norm,
a μ∗H→L = 0.33 indicates that high types expect low types to contribute roughly half of their
own contribution. The fact that in both URE and UUE high and low types enforce the same
contribution norm on each other indicates that there is consensus on what the contribution of
each type should be. In UMB the agreement seems somewhat weaker. μ∗H→L = 0.40 reveals
that high types expect low types to contribute 33 percent less than they do whereas low types
expect high types to contribute 25 percent more than they do. Interestingly, this implies that
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the disagreement in contribution norms is in favor of high types, in the sense that high types ask
for higher own relative contributions than low types actually enforce.
In principle, in addition to enforcing diﬀerent contribution norms, subjects in diﬀerent treat-
ments could diﬀer in the severity with which they punish deviations from a given norm. We can
see whether this is the case by looking at the magnitude of the estimated coeﬃcients (available
in Table 4). Interestingly, negative deviations from the contribution norm are punished similarly
across treatments.21 This suggests that the motivation to punish negative deviations from a
contribution norm is largely independent of the exact norm and individuals’ types.22
In summary, the observed diﬀerences in contributions of high types in the diﬀerent treat-
ments with punishment can be attributed to the informal enforcement of diﬀerent contribution
norms based on considerations of equality and equity. Interestingly, both high and low types
largely agree on the norm that is enforced. Therefore, it is not simply a matter of one type using
punishment to coerce the other type towards higher contributions. Of the possible contribution
norms (see Table 2), the one that is actually enforced depends on the form of heterogeneity. In
URE, where low and high types face the same maximum contribution, both types apply a norm
consistent with equal contributions, despite the fact that high types earnings are (almost) twice
as high as low types earnings. In UUE, where high types can contribute twice as much as low
types, the enforced contributions are proportional to endowments. This pattern suggests an eq-
uity based contribution norm where contributions are proportional to the capacity to contribute.
In UMB, with equal endowments but unequal marginal beneﬁts from the public good, the en-
forcement behavior of high types is consistent with a contribution norm that is proportional to
the ratio of marginal beneﬁts.
21For example, if we test whether the coeﬃcient for negative deviations of each regression equals 1.01—which is
the value of the coeﬃcient of the Equal treatment—we cannot reject the null hypothesis in any of the regressions
(Wald tests, p ≥ 0.172).
22Unlike negative deviations, punishment of positive deviations from the contribution norm (so-called antisocial
punishment) is less common. It occurs under Equal and in the punishment of low types by high types in URE.
In fact, as can be seen in Table 4, in some cases the coeﬃcient for positive deviations is restricted to zero. In
regressions without this restriction, the coeﬃcient’s value is close to zero in all cases and it is never statistically
signiﬁcant (p ≥ 0.467).
18
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we provide evidence for the emergence and informal enforcement of diﬀerent
contribution norms in public good games with homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. We ﬁnd
that, in the absence of punishment, contributions steadily decline in all treatments, which results
in similar behavior in homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. The trend towards free-riding
also dissipates potential diﬀerences between individuals with diﬀerent induced characteristics.
Indeed, the behavior that prevails in all treatments is full free-riding. In stark contrast, when
punishment is possible contributions do not only increase, but also exhibit considerable diﬀerences
across treatments and between diﬀerent types of individuals. We show that the diﬀerences in
the individuals’ contribution and sanctioning behavior are consistent with the enforcement of
diﬀerent contribution norms.
In treatments with unequal endowments, we ﬁnd that the enforced contribution norm pre-
scribes contributions that are proportional to the maximum feasible contribution. This implies
that if contributions are bounded by the endowment (as in our treatment UUE), subjects with
large endowments (high types) are expected to contribute more than subjects with small endow-
ments (low types). At the same time, if the contribution possibilities are equal between types
(as in our treatment URE) then both high and low types are expected to contribute the same
amount. In the treatment with unequal marginal beneﬁts from the public good (UMB), we ﬁnd
that the emerging norm prescribes contributions that are proportional to the ratio of marginal
beneﬁts. The identiﬁed contribution norms can be readily reconciled with considerations invok-
ing ideas of equality and equity regarding contributions to the public good. In contrast, fairness
ideas with respect to earnings fail to account for the diﬀerences across and within treatments.
This is particularly evident from the relative earnings of high and low types in UUE and URE.
Compared to UUE, in URE low types earn considerably less than high types. Hence, the enforced
contribution norms are nonconsequentialist in the sense of Elster (1989).
The emergence of diﬀerent norms among diﬀerent people in diﬀerent environments has a silver
lining and a demerit. On the one hand, it shows that people are willing and able to informally
enforce norms in heterogeneous environments, and that in spite of multiple and conﬂicting focal
norms they can tacitly agree on a unique contribution norm. This leads to relatively high
contributions to the public good in both homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. On the other
hand, it also shows that the contribution norm that is actually enforced may hinge on details of
the environment, which may make it diﬃcult to predict.
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In this paper, we concentrate on the enforcement of one norm, which is based on deviations
from a subject’s own contribution. Although this is in line with the common assumption in
the literature, it is conceivable that other fairness ideas might also be at play. In this case, the
question whether various norms are simultaneously enforced arises.23 A promising ﬁrst step in
this direction is set by the study of Carpenter and Matthews (2008), who aim at identifying
diﬀerent types of norms in public good games with homogeneous groups. The investigation of
the simultaneous enforcement of multiple norms in heterogeneous groups could build on this
work, but calls for a much larger variation of treatments and considerably more data. We leave
this for future research.
Recent theoretical and empirical studies point at the importance of norms in diverse areas of
the economy and society. On the empirical side, Kim et al. (2006) ﬁnd that norms of departmen-
tal productivity strongly inﬂuences the individual productivity of academics, and Goette et al.
(2006) report that group membership increases cooperation and the willingness to enforce coop-
erative norms in platoons of the Swiss Army. Norms have been found to inﬂuence behavior even
after individuals have moved across societies. For example, Fisman and Miguel (2007) show that
norms strongly inﬂuence illegal parking behavior of U.N. diplomats in New York, and Guiso et al.
(2006) demonstrate how the level of trust exhibited by decedents of immigrants to the United
States correlates with the level of trust of the country from which their ancestors emigrated. On
the theoretical side, Fischer and Huddart (2008) show that norms can put restrictions on opti-
mal organizational design. Our study conﬁrms that important diﬀerences in behavior between
groups can be attributed to the informal enforcement of diﬀerent norms, and are not necessarily
due to diﬀerences in the preferences of group members. Moreover, we add to this literature the
insight that heterogeneity and subtle variations in the environment can shift attention from one
focal norm to another, resulting in considerably diﬀerent outcomes.
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